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ABSTRACT 
In this paper we present the experimental results that more clearly than any theory suggest 
an answer to the question: when in detection of large (probably) prime numbers to apply, a 
very resource demanding, Miller-Rabin algorithm. Or, to put it another way, when the 
dividing by first several tens of prime numbers should be replaced by primality testing?  
As an innovation, the procedure above will be supplemented by considering the use of the 
well-known Goldbach’s conjecture in the solving of this and some other important 
questions about the RSA cryptosystem, always guided by the motto “do not harm” – neither 
the security nor the time spent. 
Keywords 
Public key cryptosystems, Prime numbers, Trial division, Miller-Rabin algorithm, 
Goldbach conjecture. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In asymmetric schemes [1] of protecting the confidentiality and integrity of 
data there is a need for large prime numbers. For some tasks required 
number of bits now exceeds 15,000, and it is still just a passing figure in the 
endless game of those who protect data and those who attack them. It is 
therefore quite clear that the time spent on detection of large prime numbers 
must be as short as possible. 
It would be best to check the divisibility of number n with all prime 
numbers less than or equal to sqrt(n). However, with so many bits it's not 
realistic. Therefore, the number which is tested to primality is previously 
divided by several tens of first prime numbers and then, if it is not divisible 
by any of these numbers, it is left to Miller-Rabin algorithm [1]. 
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It is a very difficult task to find theoretically an optimum ratio of time 
required for dividing the number and testing by Miller-Rabin algorithm. 
Perhaps a redundant task as well in terms of our needs, since in practical 
tasks such as ours, we have no reason to pretend that computers do not exist, 
that the experimentally obtained, very useful results are less valuable than 
the values obtained theoretically. 
As a useful tool for our task (minimizing the time required for detection of 
prime numbers) we see the Goldbach conjecture [2], which states that every 
(large for us) even number is the sum of two prime numbers. It may forever 
remain a conjecture, or one day some talented mathematician may write a 
book of hundreds of pages that will prove its truth, or some computer may 
find the number for which it is not valid, and with that break the conjecture. 
For those of us looking for large prime numbers none of these three matters. 
We will, in any case,  generate a random large even number 2n, of, say, 
1024 bits, and detect a much smaller random prime number of, say, 128 or 
256 bits, which is negligible in terms of time, and then verify that the 
difference of those two numbers is a prime number. If so, we have a large 
prime number. If not, we will repeat the procedure or we will use this 
difference to generate the prime number closest to it by a combination of 
dividing by first prime numbers and Miller-Rabin algorithm. Experimentally 
we will ensure that the above procedures may also result in saving the time 
required to detect a large prime number. 
2. WHY WE NEED PRIME NUMBERS 
The public key cryptography-PK [1][3],  a major breakthrough in the field 
of data secrecy and integrity protection, is mostly based on the assurance 
which has never been mathematically proved that some mathematical 
problems are difficult to solve. The two of them are particularly prominent 
and used a lot. 
Since we opted for RSA [1][3] mechanism we will point to one of them. 
The multiplication of two large prime numbers is a one-way hash function 
[1], which means that we can easily get their multiplication result. However, 
factorization of that multiplication result with the aim of getting the prime 
factors (factoring), turned out to be very difficult. This problem of 
identifying private key d in the Public Key cryptography (PK), if we know 
the public key and if it is the pair (n,e) are two equivalent problems [1][3]. 
Certainly, there are many other PK schemes, asymmetrical algorithms, apart 
from RSA. They are based on the same problem which is difficult to solve 
in practice if the number of digits is large enough, and by means of these 
schemes a one-way function with “trap door” is created. 
By technological development and progress in the field of algorithms for 
whole number factorization, the need for larger and larger prime numbers 
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has been demonstrated. This means that their multiplication result will 
consist of more and more digits. The competition between those who attack 
unprotected data and those who protect them using RSA mechanism 
requires creation of the faster operations for dealing with large numbers. 
The new arithmetic requires more efficient codes for addition, subtraction, 
multiplication and division of large numbers and what is particularly 
significant is to solve modular exponentiation in the most efficient way 
possible [4]. 
This makes sense only if special attention is paid to the creation of one’s 
large (probable) prime numbers, since the use of such numbers available on 
the Internet or in any other way is not in accordance with the very aim of 
data protection. Since the process of large prime generation requires a lot of 
time and computer resources [1][4], it is of particular interest to us to find a 
way to avoid the application of the primality testing algorithm to the number 
as much as possible. 
3. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
In order to avoid unnecessary applications of Miller-Rabin algorithm to the 
number in question, we resort to trial division by a few initial prime 
numbers, since such a division take less time. 
How far we should go with such a division is the that we are trying to 
answer in this paper? For the theory of the matter is fully resolved. 
However, that in practice we do not have much use. 
The trial division takes less time then exponentiation [1][4], but it would 
certainly be wrong to conclude that we should divide the number as long as 
possible. It is very difficult to determine the real relation between the two, 
since everything depends on the number we start with and odd numbers we 
examine so as to generate a probable prime. 
Therefore, we present two solutions that are probably irrelevant to  theorists, 
but it is very useful to people who have spent many nights to produce large 
(probably) prime numbers using its own software [4]. 
3.1 Dividing by First Several Tens of Prime Numbers 
In this paragraph we show the results of detection of prime numbers of 513, 
1024 and 1500 bits, namely: without dividing by prime numbers, dividing 
by first 10, 20, 30,…, 100 prime numbers. 
Example 1 
If we start with number c with ones in places:   c[512]:=1; c[255]:=1; 
c[200]:=1;c[127]:=1; c[100]:=1; c[50]:=1; c[10]:=1; c[9]:=1; c[8]:=1; 
c[7]:=1; c[2]:=1; c[1]:=1;  c[0]:=1;  by dividing and testing we intend to 
detect first prime number with ones in places:  c[512]:=1; c[255]:=1; 
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c[200]:=1;c[127]:=1; c[100]:=1; c[50]:=1; c[11]:=1; c[9]:=1; c[6]:=1; 
c[3]:=1; c[2]:=1; c[1]:=1; c[0]:=1; as a result we have the following table: 
TABLE 1. The Timing of Detection of a Prime Numbers 
a 353 110 91 81 73 72 67 66 65 65 
b 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 
c 1455” 466” 398” 361” 337” 342” 329” 330” 334” 337” 
d 1455” 453” 375” 334” 301” 297” 276” 272” 268” 268” 
e 0” 13” 23” 27” 36” 45” 53” 58” 66” 69” 
 
a 63 62 61 61 61 60 58 57 57 56 
b 100 110 120 130 140 150 160 170 180 200 
c 326” 328” 331” 337” 343” 345” 343” 344” 353” 358” 
d 260” 255” 251” 251” 251” 247” 239” 235” 235” 231” 
e 66” 73” 80” 86” 92” 98” 104” 109” 118” 127” 
 
Where the following row labels are valid: 
a-  number of passes through the Miller-Rabin (MR) algorithm 
b-  number of first prime numbers by which we divide the number tested  
 before passing through the MR algorithm 
c-  the total time needed for detection of a prime number 
d- time spent on the MR algorithm 
e- time spent on the division by first prime numbers  
(all times are  expressed in seconds). 
It is clear from the table that the search for prime numbers, without dividing 
by first prime numbers, is not an option. This is an unnecessary waste of 
time. Dividing by first ten prime numbers would be a minimum. Dividing 
by 60, 70, ... would be a good choice. The choice of tens of numbers more 
or less could make little savings or a small loss of time and would not 
significantly affect the quality of our task. 
Example 2 
If we start with number c with ones in places:  c[1023]:=1; c[767]:=1; 
c[512]:=1; c[255]:=1; c[127]:=1; c[100]:=1; c[50]:=1; c[10]:=1; c[9]:=1; 
c[8]:=1; c[7]:=1; c[2]:=1; c[1]:=1;  c[0]:=1;   by dividing and testing we 
intend to detect first prime number with ones in places: c[1023]:=1; 
c[767]:=1; c[512]:=1; c[255]:=1; c[127]:=1; c[100]:=1; c[50]:=1; c[11]:=1; 
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c[10]:=1; c[4]:=1; c[2]:=1; c[1]:=1; c[0]:=1; as a result we have the 
following table: 
TABLE 2. The Timing of Detection of a Prime Numbers 
a 584 178 129 115 111 107 105 101 
b 0 10 30 50 60 70 80 100 
c 18144” 5583” 4251” 3872” 3778” 3711” 3734” 3792” 
d 18144” 5518” 3999” 3565” 3441” 3317” 3255” 3131” 
e 0” 65” 252” 307” 337” 394” 479” 661” 
 
A minimum below which we should not go in generating 1024-bit prime 
numbers is dividing by first ten numbers, which reduces the time of 
detection of a prime number (about) three times. Dividing by first 60 to a 
hundred numbers reduces the time of detection of a prime number (about) 
five times, so that these values  may be a good choice. 
Example 3 
If we start with number c with ones in places:  c[1499]:=1; c[1023]:=1; 
c[767]:=1; c[512]:=1; c[255]:=1; c[127]:=1; c[100]:=1; c[50]:=1; c[10]:=1; 
c[9]:=1; c[8"1; c[7]:=1; c[2]:=1; c[1]:=1;  c[0]:=1;   by dividing and testing 
we intend to detect first prime number with ones in places: c[1499]:=1; 
c[1023]:=1; c[767]:=1; c[512]:=1; c[255]:=1; c[127]:=1; c[100]:=1; 
c[50]:=1; c[10]:=1; c[9]:=1; c[8]:=1; c[7]:=1; c[6]:=1; c[5]:=1; c[3]:=1; 
c[2]:=1; c[1]:=1; c[0]:=1; as a result we have the following table: 
TABLE 3. The Timing of Detection of a Prime Numbers 
a 50 16 15 14 12 12 12 
b 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 
c 4805” 1551” 1458” 1387” 1175” 1178” 1256” 
d 4805” 1538” 1442” 1345” 1153” 1153” 1153” 
e 0” 13” 16” 42” 22” 25” 103” 
 
Similar conclusions as in the above examples we may draw in the case of 
generating a 1500-bit number. Dividing by 50-60 first prime numbers is a 
very good choice. 
3.2 Using Goldbach Conecture 
Goldbach set the conjecture that "every even number (2n) larger than four is 
the sum of two (odd) prime numbers." [2] 
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Our idea is to detect a prime number p less than n and then to examine 
whether the difference (2n-p) is a prime number. Given that we choose p to 
be less than n (in order to detect it faster) and 2n to be a large number, 
which, if 2n-p is a prime, gives us a large prime number, avoiding the search 
through the upper part (numbers larger than n) which is in terms of time far 
more demanding job than detection of prime numbers in the lower part 
(numbers less than n). 
Of course all of this is possible if there are enough pairs with simple 
coordinates between all pairs of numbers (p, q), where p + q = 2n, p-prime 
and q-odd number. 
TABLE 4. Number of GC Pairs 
Even number 220 221 225 226 227 
Number of  
Pairs  GC 
4244 7492 83543 153881 283830 
 Number of  
pairs (*1) 
43458 82125 1078257 2064123 3958400 
% (GC) in (*1) 9.77% 9.12% 7.75% 7.45% 7.17% 
 
The Table 4. shows that Goldbach conjecture can be a useful tool in our task 
because there is a probability, though not large, of guessing the large prime 
number. A possible loss of time in detecting the prime number for the first 
coordinate is negligible because it is number less than n, and it is 
particularly  negligible compared to the possibility to immediately detect the 
other simple coordinate- a large prime number. We can get more favorable 
result, if we consider the set (*2 ) = {(p,r)} for given number 2n, p ≤ n-1, r ≥ 
n + 1, where p is a prime number and r is an odd number from the set 
{6*k+1, 6*k -1} and p + r = 2n. In any case, it is clear that by this process 
we cannot increase the time of detecting a large prime number, while we can 
significantly reduce it using favourable conditions. 
With our own software we conducted an experiment whose aim was to find 
all pairs (p, q) for given number 2n, p ≤ n-1, q ≥ n + 1, where p is a prime 
number and q is an odd number and p + q = 2n (*1). Then, among these 
pairs to find those in which the second coordinate is prime number (pairs of 
Goldbach conjecture (GC)) and to measure the time of finding a number of 
representations of number 2n which satisfy the Goldbach conjecture. 
4. SOME FURTER OBSERVATION 
If we consider the time of finding all GC pairs of some even number 2n, we 
can see that with the increase of number n, the time to find them 
significantly increases. 
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TABLE 5. Time to Find a GC Pairs 
Even number 224 225 226 227 
Number of  
pairs GC 
45752 83543 153881 283830 
Time of finding 
 the pairs GC 
56’ 42” 2h 1’ 14” 3h 29’ 48” 7h 18’ 17” 
 
4.1 Point “Multiplication” 
One of the most important operations for all applications of elliptic curves 
cryptosystems (ECC) [5] is scalar point multiplication. Scalar point 
multiplication consists of calculating the value of an integer multiplied by a 
point by doing a series of point doublings and additions until the product 
point is reached. 
Example 
For NIST recommended prime field Fp for p= 2192- 264 -1, base point P(XG, 
YG) [6]:  
XG = 0x 188da80eb03090f67cbf20eb43a118800f4ff0afd82ff1012 
YG  = 0x 07192b95ffc8da78631011ed6b24cdd53f977a11e794811, and 
k=10000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
1000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000010000000000
0000000000000000000000000000010001101011 
Coordinates of the point Q(X, Y) =k* P(XG, YG) are [6]: 
X: 0x a9355c37074c8195faa23d1d071997fe4ea7a2bdec781047 
Y:0x 911a232aabeba33b5e8f29743f2837955cd5bf1f74aa9a24  
Very similar: Even if we know 2n = 227, it takes more than seven hours to 
find a number of its GC representations. If we know the number of GC 
representations it is impossible to guess the number whose representations 
those are, which resembles a Goldbach "multiplication of point", which ends 
the "similarities" with ECC because we cannot define the addition of points. 
But, the question of using this sort of Goldbach’s point transformation (from 
starting point to the point (2n, (*1),(GC))) remains open for some further 
research. 
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4.2 The Possibility to Applying to the RSA 
The public key technique developed by Rivest, Shamir and Adelman is 
known as the RSA algorithm. The security of this approach is based on the 
fact that it can be relatively easy to multiply large primes together but 
almost impossible to factor the resulting products. RSA has became the 
algorithm that most people associate with the notion of public key 
cryptography. The  technique literally produces public keys that are tied to 
specific private keys. If Alice has a copy of Bob’s public key she can 
encrypt a message to him, and he uses his private key to decrypt it. RSA 
also allows the holder of a private key to encrypt data with it so that anyone 
with a copy of the public key can then decrypt it. While public decryption 
obviously doesn’t provide secrecy, the technique does provide digital 
signature, which attest that a particular crypto transform was performed by 
the owner of a particular private key [1][3]. 
RSA keys consist of three special numeric values that are used in pairs to 
perform encryption or decryption. The public key value is generally a 
selected constant that is recommended to be either 3 or 65537. After 
choosing the public key we generate two large prime numbers P and Q. The 
private key value is derived from P, Q, and the public key value. The 
distributed public keying material includes the constant public key value 
and the modulus N, which is the product of  P and Q. The modulus is used 
in both the encryption and decryption procedures when either the public or 
private key is used. The original primes P and Q are discarded [1][3]. 
Key generation for the RSA encryption: 
Each entity creates an RSA public key and a corresponding private key [1]. 
Algorithm 
Each entity A should do the following: 
 Generate two large distinct random primes p and q, each roughly 
the same size 
 Compute n = pq i  = (p - 1)(q - 1). 
 Select a random integer e, 1 < e < , tako da je nzd(e, ) = 1 
 Use the extended Euclidean algorithm [1]. (Algorithm 2.107) to 
compute the unique integer d, 1 < d < , such that     ed  1 (mod 
). 
 A’s public key is (n, e); A’s private key is d 
Example 1 
Let the message m [4]: “rat” or binary: m = (0)10100100110000101110100 
Select the two 128 BD primes: 
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p: 
1000000000000000000000000001000000000000000000000000000000000
0000000000000000100000000000000000000000000000000000000010101
011111. 
q: 
1000000000000000000000000001000000000000000000000000000000000
0000000000000000100000000000000000000000000000100000000000111
001011 
We count 
n = pq: 
1000000000000000000000000010000000000000000000000000001000000
0000000000000001000000000000000000000000001000100000000011100
1010100000001000000000111001010110000000000000000000000000000
0100000000011100101010000000000000000000010101011111100110100
00101010101. 
  = ( p - 1 )(q – 1 ): 
1000000000000000000000000010000000000000000000000000001000000
0000000000000001000000000000000000000000001000100000000011100
1010000000001000000000111001010010000000000000000000000000000
0100000000011100101000000000000000000000010101011110100110011
01000101100.  
Public key e = 3 or binary 11. 
Secret key d: 
1010101010101010101010101101010101010101010101010101100000000
0000000000000001010101010101010101010101100000101010101111011
1000000000001010101011110111000010101010101010101010101010101
1010101011010000110101010101010101010101110001111110001000100
0101110011. 
Encrypted message m: 
1000100001111110101010110100101100001100010110010011100000010
1000000. 
Example 2 
Let the message m [4]: “Ratne godine!”  
binary: 
m=(0)10100100110000101110100011011100110010100100000011001110
11011110110010001101001011011100110010100100001 
Encrypted message m: 
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1011111001011001110110101110101110011111011010011010100110000
0011011001000101010101000010100101001110001011010101101100111
1011000001001001100000100100110111110100100101110001001001010
0111101110011001100001000111000010101011010010101010010000010
1011110101. 
Now we point out the two possible connection between RSA and the 
Goldbach conjecture. 
4.2.1 The First Possibility 
Only powerful computers can calculate (GC) numbers of 1024, 2048, or a 
larger number of bits. We have no reasons not to believe that (*1) and (GC) 
are greater and greater numbers and at the same time (probably) they are 
unique for a given number 2n. Even if various even numbers have the same 
representation it does not matter for us because we will create a table that 
will contain in each row for a given even number the hash value (*1) and 
(GC). 
For large, probably prime numbers p1 and q1 we will calculate the number 
2n = p1 * q1 +1. 
For this number we will find (*1) and (GC) and their hash values h (*1) and 
h (GC). The procedure will be repeated k times and the table of k rows (each 
of which contains an even number and its corresponding values  h (*1) and h 
(GC)) will be, in a safe manner, delivered to users. 
Instead of a pair as a public key (2n-1, e), we suggest that the first part of 
the public key, instead of 2n-1, be h (*1) and h (GC), based on which the 
user would set the number 2n by reading the table, and therefore the number 
of 2n-1 (the RSA modulus) would be known. 
It is clear that this procedure does not weaken the RSA. It just makes it 
difficult for those who intend to reveal the secret key, because prior to the 
use of algorithms for finding prime factors of the number 2n-1=p1*q1, that 
number should be determined primarily, which is very difficult for large 
numbers if we know only h (*1) and h(GC). 
4.2.2 The Second Possibility 
Another possibility would be publishing the number 2n, which implicitly 
publishes (GC), too. (GC) may be (another part of the key pairs) public key 
for RSA (in the standard label e) if gcd((GC),θ)=1, or the first number 
greater than it that is relatively prime to θ, where θ=(p1-1)*(q1-1). This 
would be a semi-public key cryptosystem, as the users in addition to the 
secret key d, obtain in the same way, safely, the public key e, while others 
who have bad intentions must first find (implicitly published) public key e, 
which is a very demanding job in terms of time, and only then they may 
access the disclosure of the secret key d. It is clear that in the meantime, we 
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can change the parameters of RSA and thus further complicate efforts to 
breach confidentiality and integrity of our data. 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
This work, too, is in line with our belief that it is necessary that each country 
protects the confidentiality and integrity of its data using its own software 
[7]. Good experts are a prerequisite for this, and they cannot exist without 
the increased interest of young people in cryptography. We believe that 
there is no such an interest without more interesting approach to 
cryptography, and encryption of cryptographic algorithms and 
experimentation with own software is the best way for that. To this end we 
have written this paper dealing with such an important topic for practical 
cryptography: Minimizing the time of detection of large (probably) prime 
numbers. 
The consideration of our problem naturally led to the Goldbach’s conjecture 
[2]. We have noticed that the Goldbach’s conjecture can find its place in 
cryptography because its assumed property can only reduce the detection 
time (not increase it). It is quite possible that Goldbach’s conjecture can 
play an important role in hindering the intentions of an unauthorized user to 
find out the secret key mathematically, and thus to compromise the integrity 
and confidentiality of our data. 
Regarded more widely, we believe that the using of Goldbach’s conjecture 
can slow down the trend of massive transition from RSA to ECC. In that 
case, the increase in the number of bits would no longer be the only asset of 
RSA. 
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